In dealing a trio of prospects for Evan Gattis, I really don't understand what the Astros are doing. The prospect depth they have in their system could allow them to acquire a player of a much higher caliber than Gattis, preferably a younger one as well, someone who's going to contribute to the next good Astros team in a few years. Atlanta, meanwhile, has gone from a bottom-five system in baseball to likely a top-10 system, overhauling their major-league roster while adding a broad mix of near- and long-term talent to their farm, in this case trading a player somewhere near the apex of his value for a very strong return.
Gattis is already 28 years old, coming back to pro ball late after several years of off-field problems, and he brings four years of control. In two not-quite-full major-league seasons, he's shown big power, poor defense, horrible on-base skills, and huge platoon splits -- killing lefties but posting a .241/.297/.469 line against right-handers with enormous problems against right-handed breaking stuff. While Houston's a good ballpark for dead-pull right-handed power hitters, he's virtually positionless and doesn't address the Astros' major needs for hitters who get on base or at least make more contact. He's also disappeared in the second half in both of his years in the majors -- whether due to physical wear and tear or inability to make in-season adjustments -- and his body isn't durable. He's probably a bench guy, or a platoon player, but not a full-time solution at any position. The Astros also pick up James Hoyt, a hard-throwing (93-97 mph) right-hander that Atlanta signed from an independent league for $500 after the 2012 season, a good bet to provide some value in middle relief right away.
In exchange for Gattis, Atlanta gets three prospects with question marks, but all of whom are legitimate major-league prospects with real asset value today. Mike Foltynewicz is the big get, and I would have traded Gattis for him alone. Folty is a high-beta prospect with the upside of a potential No. 1 starter if he can develop a more consistent arm slot and find an average third pitch to go along with an 80 fastball and 70 curveball. He drops down on the fastball at times and comes back up to get depth on the curveball, a trick that major-league hitters will exploit. His changeup will show plus, and ditching his slider (which he did early in 2014) may help him spend more time working on the change, but the change isn't good enough now to keep lefties from sitting on his four-seamer. Drafted in the first round in 2010, he's never seen the DL, and has the size and frame to be a durable 200-inning starter. His floor is a Nate Eovaldi type, and he'd be a wipeout reliever, but Atlanta has to develop him as a starter and hope the changeup comes along to the point where he can lead their rotation in 2017.
Third baseman Rio Ruiz has developed nicely as a hitter, showing outstanding patience -- his walk rate put him among the top 10% of minor-league hitters this year, even though he was just 20 in a high-A league. Lancaster is a tremendous place to hit, however, and his power output was a little light given his home environment. He has good natural feel to hit and much of his contact is hard, but his load is getting too deep with his weight too much on his back side, interfering with his timing and reducing his ability to drive the ball out. At third base, he has the hands and arm, but he lacks rhythm in his feet and the ball tends to play him unless he's coming in on it; he has a chance to play at third, although it's at least 50/50 that he moves to first. Unlike a lot of young left-handed hitters, he has no real problem facing lefties. He projects as something similar to what Matt Carpenter has become for the Cardinals -- a high-OBP doubles hitter, a little less glove, a little more pop -- if he can stay at the hot corner.
Andrew Thurman was a command right-hander when the Astros took him out of UC-Irvine in the second round in 2013, then started hitting 95-96 in spring training last year, only to head to the cold weather of the Midwest League and struggle with his control. He'll pitch with a 55 fastball and shows three potentially average or better secondary pitches, but nothing is plus and he has to throw strikes to succeed. I still like him as a potential fourth or fifth starter, but that assumes that he can harness his newfound velocity and stop walking guys. Of the three guys Atlanta got back in this trade, he has the lowest ceiling and the lowest probability, the latter due to his difficulty against low-A hitters last season.
There's a good chance Atlanta walks out of this deal with an above-average starting pitcher and an everyday third baseman, which would be a heck of a return for a flawed player like Gattis. The Astros get four years of control of Gattis, and if they choose to use him behind the plate on occasion, the acquisition might free them up to trade one of their many catchers ... but is this the kind of player the Astros should be trying to acquire right now? They're not contenders this year, probably not in 2016, and by 2017 Gattis will be turning 31 and past peak, which we've probably already seen. I have no objection to the Astros trading from their passel of prospects to add real major-league talent, but they should be aiming higher than an OBP sinkhole who doesn't add value on defense. Foltynewicz is well-regarded throughout the industry, and I think he could have headlined a package for a much better player, now or during the 2014 season.[/i]