nsacpi
Expects Yuge Games
It looks like the Braves will have picks at about 15 and 30 in the 2015 draft.
People have widely differing views on the value of these picks. Here are some data that provide some perspective.
I'm going to look at six years of data, from the 2000-2005 drafts. You need drafts from at least ten years ago to get a clear picture of the value of the players taken. I'm going to value each player by the WAR total generated in the six-year period before they become eligible for free agency.
To add to the data I'm going to look at 3 players from each draft that most closely correspond to the picks in question. For pick #30, I look at player 29, 30 and 31 taken. For pick #15, I look at player 14, 15 and 16 each year. That way six years of data generate 18 observations to estimate the value of the pick.
It is said that draft picks are a lottery. That is certainly true, but saying that should not blind us to the value of these picks.
Let's start by looking at pick #30. Of the eighteen players in our sample, two-thirds failed to even reach the majors. Of the six who did reach the majors, four had career WAR totals below 1. Scrubs in other words. Right away this provides some perspective on some of our recent late first round picks, like Gilmartin (#28 in 2011), Hursh (#31 in 2013) and Davidson (#32 in 2014). Most players taken at that point in the draft do not amount to much. But two out of the eighteen did amount to quite a bit. Between them Adam Wainwright and Carlos Quentin generated a total of 25.5 WAR. So this lottery ticket gives you about a one out of 9 chance of getting significant value.
Not surprisingly, pick #15 is much more valuable on average. But here too there are lots of busts. Out of the 18, five never reached the majors. Another 7 did not generate value above 1 WAR in their career. So 12 out of the 18 were busts. It really is a lottery, even for a pick as early as 15. But whereas 2 out of 18 of the ones picked around #30 went on to significant careers, 6 out of 18 picked around #15 did so. That's a big difference. Listing them by in descending order of value in their pre-free agency period they were: Chase Utley, Nick Swisher, Scott Kazmir, Billy Butler, Gabe Gross and Chris Volstad. Some notable picks at around #15 in drafts more recent than our sample: Jason Heyward and Jose Fernandez. But remember two-thirds are busts, even at #15.
On average (busts and stars) the players around pick #30 in our sample generated 1.3 WAR during their pre-free agency years and those around pick #15 generated 5.2 WAR. These days the going rate for 1 WAR on the open market is about $6 million. As a rough rule, the surplus value of WAR generated in the pre-free agency years is about three quarters of the total. In other words the players in this period are only paid a quarter of what they would fetch if they were paid market rates (and this accounts for their signing bonuses as draftees). So 1.3 WAR has a surplus value of 1 WAR (or 6M dollars) and 5.2 WAR has a surplus value of close to 4 WAR (or 24 M). That certainly throws some interesting light on the true price the Mets are paying for Cuddyer. It is not 21M for 2 years but closer to 45M for 2 years. God bless Sandy Alderson. And good luck to John Hart and the Braves in next summer's lottery err draft.
People have widely differing views on the value of these picks. Here are some data that provide some perspective.
I'm going to look at six years of data, from the 2000-2005 drafts. You need drafts from at least ten years ago to get a clear picture of the value of the players taken. I'm going to value each player by the WAR total generated in the six-year period before they become eligible for free agency.
To add to the data I'm going to look at 3 players from each draft that most closely correspond to the picks in question. For pick #30, I look at player 29, 30 and 31 taken. For pick #15, I look at player 14, 15 and 16 each year. That way six years of data generate 18 observations to estimate the value of the pick.
It is said that draft picks are a lottery. That is certainly true, but saying that should not blind us to the value of these picks.
Let's start by looking at pick #30. Of the eighteen players in our sample, two-thirds failed to even reach the majors. Of the six who did reach the majors, four had career WAR totals below 1. Scrubs in other words. Right away this provides some perspective on some of our recent late first round picks, like Gilmartin (#28 in 2011), Hursh (#31 in 2013) and Davidson (#32 in 2014). Most players taken at that point in the draft do not amount to much. But two out of the eighteen did amount to quite a bit. Between them Adam Wainwright and Carlos Quentin generated a total of 25.5 WAR. So this lottery ticket gives you about a one out of 9 chance of getting significant value.
Not surprisingly, pick #15 is much more valuable on average. But here too there are lots of busts. Out of the 18, five never reached the majors. Another 7 did not generate value above 1 WAR in their career. So 12 out of the 18 were busts. It really is a lottery, even for a pick as early as 15. But whereas 2 out of 18 of the ones picked around #30 went on to significant careers, 6 out of 18 picked around #15 did so. That's a big difference. Listing them by in descending order of value in their pre-free agency period they were: Chase Utley, Nick Swisher, Scott Kazmir, Billy Butler, Gabe Gross and Chris Volstad. Some notable picks at around #15 in drafts more recent than our sample: Jason Heyward and Jose Fernandez. But remember two-thirds are busts, even at #15.
On average (busts and stars) the players around pick #30 in our sample generated 1.3 WAR during their pre-free agency years and those around pick #15 generated 5.2 WAR. These days the going rate for 1 WAR on the open market is about $6 million. As a rough rule, the surplus value of WAR generated in the pre-free agency years is about three quarters of the total. In other words the players in this period are only paid a quarter of what they would fetch if they were paid market rates (and this accounts for their signing bonuses as draftees). So 1.3 WAR has a surplus value of 1 WAR (or 6M dollars) and 5.2 WAR has a surplus value of close to 4 WAR (or 24 M). That certainly throws some interesting light on the true price the Mets are paying for Cuddyer. It is not 21M for 2 years but closer to 45M for 2 years. God bless Sandy Alderson. And good luck to John Hart and the Braves in next summer's lottery err draft.
