Second ('Third') Trump Presidency Thread

The last guy was even more of a disaster, and he got to stay. Why start removing morons now?
Literally all you can ever say is, "but the other guy..." I could care less... I was very vocal about the other morons as well.

I love it how the attitude is never, "let's be better" it's always "well, the other guy did it"

Noem is an absolute idiot... she was an idiot as a governor, she's even dumber in her position now.
 
Literally all you can ever say is, "but the other guy..." I could care less... I was very vocal about the other morons as well.

I love it how the attitude is never, "let's be better" it's always "well, the other guy did it"

Noem is an absolute idiot... she was an idiot as a governor, she's even dumber in her position now.
Idk she’s cute

She can stay
 
American citizens also seem to be having some difficulties with travel documents and the State Department. One of the invited guests to my daughter's wedding in Australia was a former Marine. He had served in an elite unit and had travelled on a military passport up until his moving to civilian life. This would have been his first trip on a civilian passport. But they stopped him at the airport. Then clarified that there was a mistake on their end and would be issuing him a new passport. His wife had to travel without him. He waited days for the new passport that he was told was being expedited but one didn't materialize in time for him to take a planned vacation with his wife. They were both bummed, to put it mildly.

I'm taking a group of students on a trip abroad in a couple months. One of them has a foreign passport. Hopefully, nothing unusual happens to him. What happened to Kenny makes me wonder if the American students (one of whom is a veteran) will be able to get in and out of the country without any hassles.
 
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Gemini I’ve read that Chinese citizens who attend international schools are required to essentially spy for China. What’s the truth behind that?

There is no evidence that Chinese students are required to sign a literal "spy agreement" as part of a standard international school enrollment contract. However, the rumor likely stems from a combination of real Chinese laws and specific conditions attached to government-funded scholarships.


Here is the breakdown of what is actually happening:


1. The National Intelligence Law (2017)


The most significant "truth" behind these concerns is Article 7 of China’s National Intelligence Law. It states that "any organization or citizen shall support, assist, and cooperate with the state intelligence work."


• Universal Application: This applies to all Chinese citizens, whether they are in a local school, an international school, or living abroad.


• The "Agreement": There isn't a separate document signed at school; the "agreement" is effectively baked into their citizenship. Under this law, if the government asks a citizen for information, they are legally obligated to provide it.


2. Government-Funded Scholarships (CSC)


The idea of "signing an agreement" is most accurate for students receiving funding from the China Scholarship Council (CSC) to study at universities abroad.


• Loyalty Pledges: Recipients often sign contracts that require them to "serve the interests of the motherland" and report back to Chinese embassies.


• Return Requirements: These contracts usually mandate that the student returns to China immediately after their studies to work for several years, or else they (and their guarantors/family) face financial penalties.


3. Monitoring and "Transnational Repression"


Recent reports from organizations like Amnesty International have documented that Chinese students abroad often feel pressured to monitor one another.


• Peer Surveillance: Students have reported being photographed at protests or having their social media activity reported to Chinese authorities by fellow students.


• Family Pressure: If a student expresses dissent abroad, authorities in China may visit their family members to "encourage" the student to change their behavior.

In short, while students aren't handing over a "spy contract" to their principal, the Chinese legal framework creates a environment where the state can legally compel any citizen to provide information if called upon.
 
What happens to the students family that is still in China if the student does not cooperate?

When a Chinese student abroad refuses to cooperate with the state or engages in "anti-government" behavior (like attending a protest or posting criticism online), the repercussions for their family back home are part of a strategy known as transnational repression.


The goal is to use the family as "hostages" to leverage the student's behavior through emotional and financial pressure.


Common Consequences for Families in China


According to reports from human rights organizations and government intelligence agencies, families may face several levels of escalation:


• "Invitations to Tea": This is a common euphemism for police summons. Security officials visit the parents at home or bring them to a police station to show them photos of their child at a protest or screenshots of their social media. They "advise" the parents to tell their child to stop.


• Employment Retaliation: Parents who work for the government, state-owned enterprises, or in academia may be fired, demoted, or denied promotions. Their retirement benefits and pensions can also be threatened.


• Financial Cutting: In some documented cases, authorities have directly instructed parents to cut off all tuition and living expenses for the student to force them to return home or go silent.


• Exit Bans: Family members may be barred from leaving China. Their passports might be confiscated to ensure they cannot join the student abroad or escape the pressure.


• Social and Educational Blacklisting: Younger siblings have been kicked out of schools or denied enrollment based on the "political unreliability" of their older sibling abroad.


How the Government Finds the Family


You might wonder how they track a student down so quickly. The process is often high-tech and community-driven:


• Digital Monitoring: WeChat is not encrypted, and the Chinese state has access to all its data. If a student uses WeChat to organize or vent, the link to their identity (and their family) is immediate.


• Peer Informants: Student groups on foreign campuses often contain "informants" (sometimes coerced themselves) who take photos of participants at rallies and send them to the local Chinese consulate.


• The "Guarantor" System: For students on government scholarships (CSC), they are required to name two "guarantors" (usually family) who are legally and financially liable if the student breaks their contract.


The Psychological Impact


The most effective tool isn't always a jail cell; it's guilt. Students often report severe mental health struggles because they know their personal freedom of speech abroad is directly "paid for" by their parents' safety and career stability at home. This leads to widespread self-censorship, where students avoid political topics even in private conversations.
 
And how about after the student graduates and goes to work in a Western tech, engineering, or aerospace company? Does the Chinese government relinquish their leverage?

In many ways, the leverage actually increases once a graduate enters a high-value field like aerospace, AI, or defense engineering. At this stage, the student is no longer just a "voice" to be silenced; they are a source of valuable "intangible assets" that the state considers essential for its national development.


The Chinese government does not view citizenship as a relationship that ends at the border or upon graduation. Instead, they utilize several mechanisms to maintain influence:


1. The "Thousand Talents" and Recruitment Programs


The state actively tracks high-achieving STEM graduates. Programs like the Thousand Talents Plan (and its various successors) offer massive financial incentives—sometimes millions of dollars in grants—for professionals to return to China or to "serve from abroad."


• The Catch: These grants often come with expectations to share research, patents, or "proprietary insights" from their Western employers.


• The Lever: If a professional refuses, the government may remind them that their ability to ever visit family again, or their family’s ability to receive state benefits, is tied to their "patriotism."


2. Legal Compulsion (Article 7)


As mentioned before, the National Intelligence Law doesn't expire. If a Chinese national working at a Western tech firm is contacted by a Chinese intelligence officer, they are legally required to cooperate.


• Corporate Espionage: In many documented FBI cases (such as the recent conviction of Ji Wang in 2025 regarding fiber laser technology), the pressure to steal trade secrets began long after the individual had established a successful career in the U.S.


• The "Greater Good" Narrative: Officials often frame the theft not as "stealing," but as "reclaiming" technology for the motherland to help China overcome "Western suppression."


3. Financial and Family "Anchors"


The leverage remains strongest through the family. If a graduate in a sensitive field (like satellite engineering) becomes "uncooperative" or considers seeking political asylum:


• Property and Assets: The state can freeze family assets or seize property in China belonging to the graduate.


• Career Sabotage: If the graduate's parents are high-ranking officials or professors, their careers are held hostage to the graduate's "loyalty."


4. The "Professional Informant" Trap


Sometimes, the leverage is built slowly. A graduate might be asked for "perfectly legal" favors first:


• "Can you just give a guest lecture at this university in China?"


• "Could you introduce this 'businessman' to your manager?"


• Once an individual has crossed a small ethical line or accepted a small payment, the state has kompromat (compromising material) they can use to blackmail the individual into more serious espionage later.


How Western Companies Respond


Because of this "permanent leverage," Western aerospace and defense companies have become extremely cautious:


• Export Controls (ITAR/EAR): Many roles in the U.S. are legally restricted to "U.S. Persons" (Citizens or Green Card holders) because the government recognizes that foreign nationals from "adversary" nations are uniquely vulnerable to state-sponsored coercion.


• Internal Monitoring: Companies now frequently monitor for "unusual data exfiltration" (downloading large amounts of code or blueprints) especially around the time a Chinese employee plans to visit home.
 
Bummer that Meta lost an engineer though. Hopefully they’re able to find one who isn’t an intelligence agent for the CCP.
Who says they lost an engineer. They have a big research presence in London. Restrictions on immigration of well-educated and talented engineers have no effects on companies like Google and Meta who have presences around the world. For smaller and mid-sized companies, including startups, there is an effect.
 
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