I'd say 5 for sure
The Coronavirus, not the beer
- Thread starter Runnin
- Start date
I'd say 5 for sure
sturg33
I
At one time the leftists were proud of their shots... Even started a thread asking for a roll call of the compliant ones
Today, they refuse to answer this question.
Quite a turn
Tapate50
Well-known member
Ignoring simple questions seem to be a pillar of leftist belief systems
nsacpi
Expects Yuge Games
too bad there aint a booster out there to help y'all with y'all's failing memories
sturg33
I
Gosh that was over 3 months ago. You're gonna need to be very careful until you can get your next one. When is that one gonna be?
nsacpi
Expects Yuge Games
Editorial in the May 2021 issue of Science.
Investigate the origins
of COVID-19
On 30 December 2019, the Program for
Monitoring Emerging Diseases notified
the world about a pneumonia of unknown
cause in Wuhan, China (1). Since then,
scientists have made remarkable progress in
understanding the causative agent, severe
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2), its transmission, pathogenesis, and mitigation by vaccines, therapeutics,
and non-pharmaceutical interventions. Yet
more investigation is still needed to determine the origin of the pandemic. Theories
of accidental release from a lab and zoonotic
spillover both remain viable. Knowing how
COVID-19 emerged is critical for informing global strategies to mitigate the risk of
future outbreaks.
In May 2020, the World Health
Assembly requested that the World Health
Organization (WHO) director-general work
closely with partners to determine the
origins of SARS-CoV-2 (2). In November,
the Terms of Reference for a China–WHO
joint study were released (3). The information, data, and samples for the study’s first
phase were collected and summarized by
the Chinese half of the team; the rest of the
team built on this analysis. Although there
were no findings in clear support of either
a natural spillover or a lab accident, the
team assessed a zoonotic spillover from an
intermediate host as “likely to very likely,”
and a laboratory incident as “extremely
unlikely” [(4), p. 9]. Furthermore, the two
theories were not given balanced consideration. Only 4 of the 313 pages of the report
and its annexes addressed the possibility
of a laboratory accident (4). Notably, WHO
Director-General Tedros Ghebreyesus commented that the report’s consideration of
evidence supporting a laboratory accident
was insufficient and offered to provide
additional resources to fully evaluate the
possibility (5).
As scientists with relevant expertise, we
agree with the WHO director-general (5),
the United States and 13 other countries (6),
and the European Union (7) that greater
clarity about the origins of this pandemic is
necessary and feasible to achieve. We must
take hypotheses about both natural and
laboratory spillovers seriously until we have
sufficient data. A proper investigation should
be transparent, objective, data-driven,
inclusive of broad expertise, subject to
independent oversight, and responsibly
managed to minimize the impact of conflicts
of interest. Public health agencies and
research laboratories alike need to open their
records to the public. Investigators should
document the veracity and provenance of
data from which analyses are conducted
and conclusions drawn, so that analyses are
reproducible by independent experts.
Finally, in this time of unfortunate antiAsian sentiment in some countries, we note
that at the beginning of the pandemic, it was
Chinese doctors, scientists, journalists, and
citizens who shared with the world crucial
information about the spread of the virus—
often at great personal cost (8, 9). We should
show the same determination in promoting
a dispassionate science-based discourse on
this difficult but important issue.
Jesse D. Bloom1,2, Yujia Alina Chan3
, Ralph S.
Baric4
, Pamela J. Bjorkman5
, Sarah Cobey6
,
Benjamin E. Deverman3
, David N. Fisman7
, Ravindra
Gupta8
, Akiko Iwasaki9,2, Marc Lipsitch10, Ruslan
Medzhitov9,2, Richard A. Neher11, Rasmus Nielsen12
,
Nick Patterson13, Tim Stearns14
,
Erik van Nimwegen11, Michael Worobey15
,
David A. Relman16,17*
1Basic Sciences and Computational Biology, Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Seattle, WA
98109, USA. 2Howard Hughes Medical Institute,
Chevy Chase, MD 20815, USA. 3Stanley Center
for Psychiatric Research, Broad Institute of
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA. 4Department
of Epidemiology and Department of Microbiology &
Immunology, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA. 5Division of Biology
and Biological Engineering, California Institute of
Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA. 6Department
of Ecology and Evolution, University of Chicago,
Chicago, IL 60637, USA. 7Dalla Lana School of Public
Health, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S
1A8, Canada. 8Cambridge Institute of Therapeutic
Immunology & Infectious Disease, Cambridge, UK.
9Department of Immunobiology, Yale University
School of Medicine, New Haven, CT 06519, USA.
10Department of Immunology and Infectious
Diseases and Center for Communicable Disease
Dynamics, Department of Epidemiology, Harvard
T. H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA
02115, USA. 11Biozentrum, University of Basel and
Swiss Institute of Bioinformatics, Basel, Switzerland.
12Department of Integrative Biology and Department
of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley, CA
94720, USA. 13Department of Human Evolutionary
Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138,
USA. 14Department of Biology and Department of
Genetics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305,
USA. 15Department of Ecology and Evolutionary
Biology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721,
USA. 16Department of Medicine and Department of
Microbiology & Immunology, Stanford University
School of Medicine, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.
17Center for International Security and Cooperation,
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA
Investigate the origins
of COVID-19
On 30 December 2019, the Program for
Monitoring Emerging Diseases notified
the world about a pneumonia of unknown
cause in Wuhan, China (1). Since then,
scientists have made remarkable progress in
understanding the causative agent, severe
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2), its transmission, pathogenesis, and mitigation by vaccines, therapeutics,
and non-pharmaceutical interventions. Yet
more investigation is still needed to determine the origin of the pandemic. Theories
of accidental release from a lab and zoonotic
spillover both remain viable. Knowing how
COVID-19 emerged is critical for informing global strategies to mitigate the risk of
future outbreaks.
In May 2020, the World Health
Assembly requested that the World Health
Organization (WHO) director-general work
closely with partners to determine the
origins of SARS-CoV-2 (2). In November,
the Terms of Reference for a China–WHO
joint study were released (3). The information, data, and samples for the study’s first
phase were collected and summarized by
the Chinese half of the team; the rest of the
team built on this analysis. Although there
were no findings in clear support of either
a natural spillover or a lab accident, the
team assessed a zoonotic spillover from an
intermediate host as “likely to very likely,”
and a laboratory incident as “extremely
unlikely” [(4), p. 9]. Furthermore, the two
theories were not given balanced consideration. Only 4 of the 313 pages of the report
and its annexes addressed the possibility
of a laboratory accident (4). Notably, WHO
Director-General Tedros Ghebreyesus commented that the report’s consideration of
evidence supporting a laboratory accident
was insufficient and offered to provide
additional resources to fully evaluate the
possibility (5).
As scientists with relevant expertise, we
agree with the WHO director-general (5),
the United States and 13 other countries (6),
and the European Union (7) that greater
clarity about the origins of this pandemic is
necessary and feasible to achieve. We must
take hypotheses about both natural and
laboratory spillovers seriously until we have
sufficient data. A proper investigation should
be transparent, objective, data-driven,
inclusive of broad expertise, subject to
independent oversight, and responsibly
managed to minimize the impact of conflicts
of interest. Public health agencies and
research laboratories alike need to open their
records to the public. Investigators should
document the veracity and provenance of
data from which analyses are conducted
and conclusions drawn, so that analyses are
reproducible by independent experts.
Finally, in this time of unfortunate antiAsian sentiment in some countries, we note
that at the beginning of the pandemic, it was
Chinese doctors, scientists, journalists, and
citizens who shared with the world crucial
information about the spread of the virus—
often at great personal cost (8, 9). We should
show the same determination in promoting
a dispassionate science-based discourse on
this difficult but important issue.
Jesse D. Bloom1,2, Yujia Alina Chan3
, Ralph S.
Baric4
, Pamela J. Bjorkman5
, Sarah Cobey6
,
Benjamin E. Deverman3
, David N. Fisman7
, Ravindra
Gupta8
, Akiko Iwasaki9,2, Marc Lipsitch10, Ruslan
Medzhitov9,2, Richard A. Neher11, Rasmus Nielsen12
,
Nick Patterson13, Tim Stearns14
,
Erik van Nimwegen11, Michael Worobey15
,
David A. Relman16,17*
1Basic Sciences and Computational Biology, Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Seattle, WA
98109, USA. 2Howard Hughes Medical Institute,
Chevy Chase, MD 20815, USA. 3Stanley Center
for Psychiatric Research, Broad Institute of
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA. 4Department
of Epidemiology and Department of Microbiology &
Immunology, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA. 5Division of Biology
and Biological Engineering, California Institute of
Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA. 6Department
of Ecology and Evolution, University of Chicago,
Chicago, IL 60637, USA. 7Dalla Lana School of Public
Health, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S
1A8, Canada. 8Cambridge Institute of Therapeutic
Immunology & Infectious Disease, Cambridge, UK.
9Department of Immunobiology, Yale University
School of Medicine, New Haven, CT 06519, USA.
10Department of Immunology and Infectious
Diseases and Center for Communicable Disease
Dynamics, Department of Epidemiology, Harvard
T. H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA
02115, USA. 11Biozentrum, University of Basel and
Swiss Institute of Bioinformatics, Basel, Switzerland.
12Department of Integrative Biology and Department
of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley, CA
94720, USA. 13Department of Human Evolutionary
Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138,
USA. 14Department of Biology and Department of
Genetics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305,
USA. 15Department of Ecology and Evolutionary
Biology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721,
USA. 16Department of Medicine and Department of
Microbiology & Immunology, Stanford University
School of Medicine, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.
17Center for International Security and Cooperation,
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA
sturg33
I
A critical thinker can extrapolate this to nearly everything leftists made a fool of themselves on. They are simply broken.
Tapate50
Well-known member
OOF-
Contact tracing. For some infectious diseases, such as Ebola and syphilis, contact tracing is critically important. For a commonly circulating viral infection such as COVID, it was a hopeless waste of valuable public health resources that did not stop the disease.
Contact tracing. For some infectious diseases, such as Ebola and syphilis, contact tracing is critically important. For a commonly circulating viral infection such as COVID, it was a hopeless waste of valuable public health resources that did not stop the disease.
Fauchi is symbolic of what has happened to the world.
Academics/Experts bought and paid for that lie to the world to push the globalists orders.
Oh man - Remember how many times I had to school the BL on how pointless contact tracing was? He LOVED that idea early on as part of his kitchen sink approach.
Tapate50
Well-known member
He was willing to pay big money for more CT, and to employ many more to do so.
it was a pillar of prevention.
LOL.