Presiding Justice Renwick and I find that Supreme Court correctly found defendants liable. We agree with Supreme Court that the Attorney General acted well within her lawful power in bringing this action, and that she vindicated a public interest in doing so. We also find that Supreme Court properly ruled only on claims that are timely under the applicable statute of limitations. However, we would modify the remedy ordered by Supreme Court. While the injunctive relief ordered by the court is well crafted to curb defendants’ business culture, the court’s disgorgement order, which directs that defendants pay nearly half a billion dollars to the State of New York, is an excessive fine that violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Because none of the three decisions garners a majority, Justices Higgitt and Rosado join the decretal of this decision for the sole purpose of ensuring finality, thereby affording the parties a path for appeal to the Court of Appeals. Like Justice Friedman, we commend them for doing so. Unlike Justice Friedman, we do not find that this necessary measure is unfair to defendants.
The loan documents’ insistence on the annual submission of accurate SFCs is definitive objective evidence of the SFCs’ materiality. The quantitative factor (which Justice Higgitt refers to as the “magnitudes of disparity”) is also objectively material to the loans as the disparities ranged between $812 million to $2.2 billion, or 17.27% to 38.51% of President Trump’s net worth, depending on the year. The objective materiality test in securities fraud cases considers both qualitative and quantitative factors (see ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chicago v JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F3d 187, 204 [2d Cir 2009]). Supreme Court considered only the quantitative factor. The “context” in ECA, was that an investment bank’s alleged $2 billion mischaracterization in its financial disclosures was not “staggering” (and thus, not quantitatively material) because $2 billion amounted to approximately 0.3% of the bank’s total assets of $715 billion (id.). Indeed, as ECA noted, the federal courts have used a “five percent numerical threshold [as] a good starting place for assessing the materiality” of a misstatement or omission (id.). Here, placed in context, the disparities were quantitatively material as a matter of law as the amounts were significatively over the five percent numerical “starting place.”
The SFCs were similarly objectively material to the Zurich Policy, but for different reasons. Between 2007 and 2021 Zurich North America underwrote a $6 million (single) and $20 million (aggregate) surety bond program for the Trump Organization. Under the surety bond program, President Trump was required to personally indemnify Zurich for any claims paid under the program and to disclose his SFCs to Zurich annually in an “onsite” review, where documents could be reviewed but not copied or taken from the meeting. Zurich underwriter Claudia Mouradian started working on the Trump Organization account in October or November 2017. She testified at her deposition that in reviewing President Trump’s 2018 and 2019 SFCs onsite, she wrote notes on the amount of cash that was reflected in the SFCs. She testified that the amount of available cash was important because Zurich looks to an insured’s cash assets for repayment on claims. She explained that it would have been important for her to have known that President Trump did not control approximately $24 million that the SFCs included as cash because then “the true amount of cash held by the Trump Organization would be less, less than what is stated.” Mouradian further testified that during her review, Weisselberg told her that the real estate valuations in the SFCs were done by professional appraisers, which was important to her because she might not have relied on the valuations in the same way had she known that the statement was not true. Based on her onsite review of the 2018 and 2019 SFCs, Zurich renewed the Trump Organization’s coverage for 2019 and 2020 with the same premium.
Nor is the objective materiality of the estimated current values any less important because, as testified to by defendants’ witnesses, the sophisticated counterparties would have understood that the SFCs were only a “roadmap” or a “starting point” for performing their own analysis and/or because they performed their own due diligence.31 By characterizing the SFCs as a roadmap or a starting point, defendants concede that the sophisticated lenders did rely on SFCs.32 Moreover, that the banks performed due diligence but failed to uncover the fraudulent conduct does not alter the evidence that defendants engaged in repeated or persistent fraudulent acts in violation of Executive Law § 63(12).
For example, Justice Higgitt cites to Mar-a-Lago, adopting defendants’ explanation that many of the assets are “simply too unique” for there to be relevant market data. The problem, however, is not that an attempt to appraise Mar-a-Lago within the meaning ascribed by the Attorney General and Supreme Court would be futile, as Justice Higgitt reasons. Rather, the problem is that the Trump Organization lumped Mar-a-Lago into a group of more than a dozen properties in the SFCs, which hid that they overvalued the property. Mar-a-Lago was overvalued because the Trump Organization ignored the reality that the “Land,” as described in the Deed of Development Rights, was conveyed to the National Trust for perpetual use as a social club. The Trump Organization ignored this reality when they used sales of other Palm Beach residential properties that had no use restrictions to generate a “Value per acre” which they then multiplied by the total acres of Mar-a-Lago even though the Club occupies the “Land.” In addition, Note 3 to the SFCs regarding “Club Facilities and Related Real Estate” valuations provides that in “those cases where a residential component exists, comparable sales were utilized in arriving at their values.” This is another indicia of the SFCs’ fraudulent nature. How can defendants say that Mar-aLago is “simply too unique” for there to be relevant market data but value the property using “comparable sales”?
Neither the Attorney General, nor Supreme Court, ever valued Mar-a-Lago at precisely $18 million at the low end or $27 million at the high end. Rather, the record demonstrates that Mar-a-Lago’s valuations were fraudulently inflated by material amounts based on the substantial discrepancy between the County’s tax valuation (valuations to which defendants agreed) and defendants’ valuations, which failed to account for the property’s restrictions.