Nick Markakis, Greek God of Exit Velocity

I know they're getting better, but there's a large element of subjectivity in UZR and DRS, right?

What isn't subjective is the number of chances he handled. 291. Even if they misclassified some of his chances - "routine" vs. "likely", for instance - and they missed badly, say, there were actually double the number of chances an average fielder wouldn't have made that Jason did - that's 16 balls. So average is 275. Jason's 291. That's one every ten games or so.

And let's say that's worth 2.5 WAR not 3.

He provides $20m of value with 16 catches in a year adjusting for your points.

I just don't buy that. He's not saving anything like 24 RAR. He doesn't get enough non-routine opportunities to impact the game with defense in RF (28 in 2015, to be exact). You can't make that big a difference playing defense in RF.

And I like/love Jason Heyward. But his wonderful defensive skills don't make enough of a difference to pay him like an elite player, which the Cubs have done.
Without diving into the rest of your post. Again I'll say that those aresponsible just fielding chances in the air. Which is only part of outfield defense. How many doubles does he turn into singles? Inside fielding won't tell you. But that is included in uzr and drs

edit 1: Is 24 million a year really elite? At your 8 million per WAR earlier it seems he's only being paid like a 3 WAR player. He's that with average defense.
 
Without diving into the rest of your post. Again I'll say that those aresponsible just fielding chances in the air. Which is only part of outfield defense. How many doubles does he turn into singles? Inside fielding won't tell you. But that is included in uzr and drs

edit 1: Is 24 million a year really elite? At your 8 million per WAR earlier it seems he's only being paid like a 3 WAR player. He's that with average defense.

Well, sure. There are a lot of assumptions that go into that statistic. Just as there are a lot of assumptions that go into DRS or UZR. But just looking at the sheer volume of plays that he gets, there just aren't that many opportunities for him to make a difference versus an average right fielder.

You might actually read my post a little closer because it's very clear and might give you some insight into the issue I am pointing out. I am pretty well convinced I am right, and Bill James is pretty well convinced of this problem as well. And he's the guy that started the fire.

The $8m per WAR is the nsacpi scale from last offseason. My Point is he's not a six WAR player, because a significant portion of that value is based on some very questionable statistics. Mike Trout might be. But that's because of his offensive capabilities which I believe are easier to quantify into wins above replacement.
 
Well, sure. There are a lot of assumptions that go into that statistic. Just as there are a lot of assumptions that go into DRS or UZR. But just looking at the sheer volume of plays that he gets, there just aren't that many opportunities for him to make a difference versus an average right fielder.

You might actually read my post a little closer because it's very clear and might give you some insight into the issue I am pointing out. I am pretty well convinced I am right, and Bill James is pretty well convinced of this problem as well. And he's the guy that started the fire.

The $8m per WAR is the nsacpi scale from last offseason. My Point is he's not a six WAR player, because a significant portion of that value is based on some very questionable statistics. Mike Trout might be. But that's because of his offensive capabilities which I believe are easier to quantify into wins above replacement.

The people at DRS responded to James' about this last year:

"Offensive Linear Weights similarly have an "expectation", or baseline. It's zero. In other words, when the batter steps up to the plate, he could single (+0.45 runs), homer (+1.40 runs), strike out (-0.30 runs), or any number of possible outcomes. (Obviously, the actual run expectancy change of the play will depend on the runners and outs, but we're dealing with averages here as Linear Weights does.) The batter will make an out (-0.30) far more often than he'll get a hit, but the average of every outcome's run value will be 0.00. By definition. If the frequency of events changes, the run values of each event change to keep the average at 0.00.

You could explain our Range and Positioning calculation in the following way. Back to our batter stepping up to the plate. The expectation of this play is zero, 0.00. The pitcher and batter do their thing, and sometimes the ball is put in play. The ball is in the air or on the ground, weak grounder or screaming liner, on its way to something. En route, even before the play has been resolved, we can consider the expectation of the play to have changed.

It might be a screaming liner that is a sure single 100% of the time. In this case, the value of the play is now 0.45, the run value of a single.

It might be a pop up on the infield, a sure out 100% of the time. In this case, the value of the play is now -0.30, the run value of an out.

It might be a hard grounder towards third. Let's say we estimate that it's a single 50% of the time, and it's an out 50% of the time. In this case, the expectation of the play is now 0.50*0.45+0.50*(-0.30) = 0.075. (We're using a simple binary example, but note that we can use any number of outcomes with their respective estimated frequencies and run values.) The play has jumped from 0.00 to 0.075, so that hard grounder was a positive outcome for the batter.

Now we get to evaluate the fielder. If he makes the play, it's an out. We credit the fielder 0.075 - (-0.30) = +0.375. If he fails to make the play, it's a single, and we penalize the fielder 0.075 - 0.45 = -0.375. So, while the difference between the hit and the out is 0.75, we're actually giving/penalizing the fielder a fraction of that, depending on the difficulty (expectation) of the play.

The Defensive Runs Saved system's job is to accurate estimate the difficulty, or "expectation" of each play given a league average fielder, since we use a league average baseline for each position."

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The runs saved or lost that DRS uses is based off of the linear weights used to calculate wOBA which imo is the best offensive stat that we have. Every event (homer, single, etc) is worth X amount of runs based on historical evidence of what those events actually did for actual runs scored. It changes with the run scoring environment so for example a homer in 2013 is worth more than a homer in 2000 (due to the frequency of the event).

So as the example above says if there is a play that's a single 50% of the time and an out 50% of the time then that fielder either gets positive 0.375 if he makes the or -0.375 if he fails to make it. This is on every play. So to say that Player X in the outfield only made 10 or whatever plays (which are just catches by the way) just has no context to go with it. Again if the outfielder makes a play in the gap that goes for a double 50% of the time then he again is getting credited with the 0.375 for that play. All of those things add up.

And my point about the 24 million is that he is worth that on his offense alone based on the 8 million per WAR scale. Again he was a 3.5 WAR player based on his offense, position, and playing time in 2015. If you think the best defensive right fielder in baseball isn't worth 2.5 wins then how many would you estimate he is worth? 2? 1? 0.5? Is a 4 WAR player not worth 24 million a year in todays market?
 
The people at DRS responded to James' about this last year:

"Offensive Linear Weights similarly have an "expectation", or baseline. It's zero. In other words, when the batter steps up to the plate, he could single (+0.45 runs), homer (+1.40 runs), strike out (-0.30 runs), or any number of possible outcomes. (Obviously, the actual run expectancy change of the play will depend on the runners and outs, but we're dealing with averages here as Linear Weights does.) The batter will make an out (-0.30) far more often than he'll get a hit, but the average of every outcome's run value will be 0.00. By definition. If the frequency of events changes, the run values of each event change to keep the average at 0.00.

You could explain our Range and Positioning calculation in the following way. Back to our batter stepping up to the plate. The expectation of this play is zero, 0.00. The pitcher and batter do their thing, and sometimes the ball is put in play. The ball is in the air or on the ground, weak grounder or screaming liner, on its way to something. En route, even before the play has been resolved, we can consider the expectation of the play to have changed.

It might be a screaming liner that is a sure single 100% of the time. In this case, the value of the play is now 0.45, the run value of a single.

It might be a pop up on the infield, a sure out 100% of the time. In this case, the value of the play is now -0.30, the run value of an out.

It might be a hard grounder towards third. Let's say we estimate that it's a single 50% of the time, and it's an out 50% of the time. In this case, the expectation of the play is now 0.50*0.45+0.50*(-0.30) = 0.075. (We're using a simple binary example, but note that we can use any number of outcomes with their respective estimated frequencies and run values.) The play has jumped from 0.00 to 0.075, so that hard grounder was a positive outcome for the batter.

Now we get to evaluate the fielder. If he makes the play, it's an out. We credit the fielder 0.075 - (-0.30) = +0.375. If he fails to make the play, it's a single, and we penalize the fielder 0.075 - 0.45 = -0.375. So, while the difference between the hit and the out is 0.75, we're actually giving/penalizing the fielder a fraction of that, depending on the difficulty (expectation) of the play.

The Defensive Runs Saved system's job is to accurate estimate the difficulty, or "expectation" of each play given a league average fielder, since we use a league average baseline for each position."

------

The runs saved or lost that DRS uses is based off of the linear weights used to calculate wOBA which imo is the best offensive stat that we have. Every event (homer, single, etc) is worth X amount of runs based on historical evidence of what those events actually did for actual runs scored. It changes with the run scoring environment so for example a homer in 2013 is worth more than a homer in 2000 (due to the frequency of the event).

So as the example above says if there is a play that's a single 50% of the time and an out 50% of the time then that fielder either gets positive 0.375 if he makes the or -0.375 if he fails to make it. This is on every play. So to say that Player X in the outfield only made 10 or whatever plays (which are just catches by the way) just has no context to go with it. Again if the outfielder makes a play in the gap that goes for a double 50% of the time then he again is getting credited with the 0.375 for that play. All of those things add up.

And my point about the 24 million is that he is worth that on his offense alone based on the 8 million per WAR scale. Again he was a 3.5 WAR player based on his offense, position, and playing time in 2015. If you think the best defensive right fielder in baseball isn't worth 2.5 wins then how many would you estimate he is worth? 2? 1? 0.5? Is a 4 WAR player not worth 24 million a year in todays market?

Thanks for your comments and interesting points.

You've made my point. See the bolded type. Before there's a beautifully conceived formula to weigh the value of each play, there's a subjective judgment on the batted ball itself to determine where on the spectrum of routine to impossible the play is.

Inside Edge has that underlying data, too, it just doesn't doesn't do anything with it. What was useful to me was confirming what I was intuiting all along - specifically, that there aren't enough opportunities for [right fielders] to impact a game on defense to weigh dWAR the way we are.

263 of JH's 291 chances were routine and an average RF would make 283 of the ones he made. The significance to me is that it puts raw data behind the numbers. If the formula has him impacting runs scored by more than a few, it's overvaluing him.

I do think there is validity to your point that there's more to defense than batted balls. They've not really addressed that very well, either, such as when Freddie is low-rated (they need to include digs and scoops of throws) or Lucroy is a 7.0 player because he had a good year framing.

As to your salary point, let me explain myself better. The Cubs gave him $24m a year. If GMs thought dWAR were really valid, he would have gotten a lot more. They pay a premium for good defense, for sure. But it's not analogous to oWAR. Maybe nsacpi should reconsider his "$X per WAR" analysis to be weighted differently - or maybe the current value of dWAR should be tamped down.

I'm not getting paid to figure out what that formulaic change looks like, so I'll leave it somebody who does this for a living to figure out. Jason is probably worth an extra WAR over his offensive value. Andrelton is probably worth 2.5, because I am assuming he will get more non-routine chances, and more chances.
 
Thanks for your comments and interesting points.

You've made my point. See the bolded type. Before there's a beautifully conceived formula to weigh the value of each play, there's a subjective judgment on the batted ball itself to determine where on the spectrum of routine to impossible the play is.

Inside Edge has that underlying data, too, it just doesn't doesn't do anything with it. What was useful to me was confirming what I was intuiting all along - specifically, that there aren't enough opportunities for [right fielders] to impact a game on defense to weigh dWAR the way we are.

263 of JH's 291 chances were routine and an average RF would make 283 of the ones he made. The significance to me is that it puts raw data behind the numbers. If the formula has him impacting runs scored by more than a few, it's overvaluing him.

I do think there is validity to your point that there's more to defense than batted balls. They've not really addressed that very well, either, such as when Freddie is low-rated (they need to include digs and scoops of throws) or Lucroy is a 7.0 player because he had a good year framing.

As to your salary point, let me explain myself better. The Cubs gave him $24m a year. If GMs thought dWAR were really valid, he would have gotten a lot more. They pay a premium for good defense, for sure. But it's not analogous to oWAR. Maybe nsacpi should reconsider his "$X per WAR" analysis to be weighted differently - or maybe the current value of dWAR should be tamped down.

I'm not getting paid to figure out what that formulaic change looks like, so I'll leave it somebody who does this for a living to figure out. Jason is probably worth an extra WAR over his offensive value. Andrelton is probably worth 2.5, because I am assuming he will get more non-routine chances, and more chances.

Sure, everything is subjective. However the difference between inside fielding and what DRS uses is that inside fielding for the most part is actual humans judging the play. DRS uses computer models based on historical evidence that if player X is in zone A and the ball is hit into zone D then on average the play is converted into an out 50% of the time. Now there are other things that go into that are human based (determining of fly balls, line drives, etc) but it's a lot better than 'That looked hard'.

I think the whole 'not enough opportunities' isn't a strong counter argument either. Is Simmons really saving 20-30 runs a year? Sure he is getting more opportunities as a SS but 90% of those are routine for any shortstop anyways. And any special play he does play is just saving a single so it's not that important, right?
 
Sure, everything is subjective. However the difference between inside fielding and what DRS uses is that inside fielding for the most part is actual humans judging the play. DRS uses computer models based on historical evidence that if player X is in zone A and the ball is hit into zone D then on average the play is converted into an out 50% of the time. Now there are other things that go into that are human based (determining of fly balls, line drives, etc) but it's a lot better than 'That looked hard'.

I think the whole 'not enough opportunities' isn't a strong counter argument either. Is Simmons really saving 20-30 runs a year? Sure he is getting more opportunities as a SS but 90% of those are routine for any shortstop anyways. And any special play he does play is just saving a single so it's not that important, right?

Thanks, I didn't understand that difference in harvesting data. I would concede you would get a more objective read from doing it the way you're saying.

So maybe it does a better job with the classification, but that wasn't really my point. The point was that the volume of balls hit to him (291) and the volume of balls any system would judge routine (263 from IE, but could be more or less) leave few chances to distinguish himself from an ordinary right fielder.

And that I couldn't (and can't) see a way to translate that into as many RAR or dWAR as he is rated with, and again trying to address the defensive side of the WAR equation. Because I, too, would like to distill a player's value down to one number derived from impact on runs, and I feel that the current measure isn't accurate.

And I'm not falling into your trap on the 'just a single' thing. :eusa_naughty:
 
Thanks, I didn't understand that difference in harvesting data. I would concede you would get a more objective read from doing it the way you're saying.

So maybe it does a better job with the classification, but that wasn't really my point. The point was that the volume of balls hit to him (291) and the volume of balls any system would judge routine (263 from IE, but could be more or less) leave few chances to distinguish himself from an ordinary right fielder.

And that I couldn't (and can't) see a way to translate that into as many RAR or dWAR as he is rated with, and again trying to address the defensive side of the WAR equation. Because I, too, would like to distill a player's value down to one number derived from impact on runs, and I feel that the current measure isn't accurate.

And I'm not falling into your trap on the 'just a single' thing. :eusa_naughty:

I think that if you look into that it doesn't take a whole lot to move the needle that much. I mean this is a game that an extra 2 singles a month is enough to boost your OPS by 50 points. Also it's more about the % of plays you convert over the actual number of players than the average player. Which is why you see elite SS saving 20+ runs, the same as a CF or RF regardless of the differences in chances they have.
 
Neck is so disheartened by his congratulatory thread turning into an argument about his predecessor that his OPS has dipped below .800.
 
Neck is so disheartened by his congratulatory thread turning into an argument about his predecessor that his OPS has dipped below .800.

Julio, I'm sorry I hijacked your thread. Don't worry, it had run its course. You can go back and reread the first three pages and ignore the last two.
 
Julio, I'm sorry I hijacked your thread. Don't worry, it had run its course. You can go back and reread the first three pages and ignore the last two.

When Nick turns into a slow-footed, slap-hitting corner outfielder with enough OBP skills to salvage league average offense, I'm blaming you, buddy.

Er, never mind.
 
I think if Neck were here he would slap gov for you, but he wouldn't be able to get power without rotating his neck for the windup.
 
I think if Neck were here he would slap gov for you, but he wouldn't be able to get power without rotating his neck for the windup.

What was all that lifting for, if not to slap fools who disrespeck the neck?

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